



 Page 1 
Prodi Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA: 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
















During the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s foreign policy showed a 
high level of global participation. It had been recognized as a pivotal state by the 
international community. It played an important role in many international issues 
ranging from international security, economy, democracy and human rights, to climate 
change. In addition, the robust economic growth and the defence budget policy had 
contributed to the road toward a rising power status. This paper is a critical review of 
the literatures on the moment Indonesia’s rise in international politics during the 
Yudhoyono presidency. The focus of this paper is to identify the driving factors behind 
the rise of Indonesia towards a global power. This paper concludes that ideational 
factors primarily the idea of the elite play a crucial role beyond the economic and 
military structures. 
 





Pada masa pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, politik luar negeri 
Indonesia menunjukkan tingkat partisipasi global yang tinggi dan diakui oleh 
masyarakat internasional. Artinya, Indonesia memainkan peran penting dalam 
banyak masalah internasional mulai dari keamanan internasional, ekonomi, 
demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia, hingga perubahan iklim. Selain itu, 
pertumbuhan ekonomi yang kuat dan kebijakan anggaran pertahanan telah 
berkontribusi pada jalan menuju peningkatan status kekuatan. Tulisan ini 
merupakan tinjauan kritis terhadap literatur tentang momen kebangkitan 
Indonesia dalam politik internasional pada masa kepresidenan Yudhoyono. Fokus 
tulisan ini adalah mengidentifikasi faktor-faktor pendorong kebangkitan 
Indonesia menuju kekuatan global. Makalah ini menyimpulkan bahwa faktor 
ideasional terutama gagasan tentang elit memainkan peran penting di luar struktur 
ekonomi dan militer. 
 
Kata kunci: Kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia, kepresidenan Yudhoyono, 
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Introduction  
Indonesia’s foreign policy has 
always been attracted many people, 
especially for non-Indonesians. There are a 
lot of books, journals, academic papers, 
and so forth written by non-natives 
depicting Indonesia’s behaviour in 
international stage. This is primarily due to 
the country’s potentials such as its 
strategic location, natural resources, 
cultural diversity, and population. Many 
observers recognised Indonesia as one 
pivot in Asia other than China, India, 
Japan, and South Korea. This is not 
surprising that Chase, Hill, and Kennedy 
almost two decades ago put Indonesia at 
the first among nine pivotal states that 
matter for the US foreign policy in the 
developing world (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 
1999). Although pivotal states are caught 
in the middle of great powers competition, 
it can “shape the security environment 
through policies of their own” (Sweijs 
et.al, 2014). Daniel Kliman pointed out the 
strategic opportunity of Indonesia as a 
‘global swing state’ to take responsibility 
in managing global architecture. He goes 
further that Indonesia has capacity to 
defend and strengthen international order 
due to its large and growing economy, 
strategic location, and commitment to 
democracy (Kliman, 2012). From this 
point of view, it is possible for Indonesia 
to become a great power in the next 
decade.  
Since the era of independence in 
1945, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been 
studied by sorting its periodisation; from 
the reign of one leader to another. It is not 
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foreign policy under Sukarno’, 
‘Indonesia’s foreign policy under Suharto’, 
‘Indonesia’s foreign policy under the 
Reform era’, ‘Indonesia’s foreign policy 
under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’, 
‘Indonesia’s foreign policy under Joko 
Widodo’, and so forth. This method 
provides an appropriate understanding 
given the characteristics of the foreign 
policy of any government often shows a 
striking difference between one and the 
other. In addition, it also facilitates 
observers to identify continuity and change 
across history. 
Unlike the previous era, academic 
works on Indonesia’s foreign policy during 
the reign of Yudhoyono were relatively 
abundant. This is likely motivated by 
several reasons. First, the domestic context 
in which democratisation has opened the 
taps of freedom of thought for anyone 
which is almost impossible during the 
Suharto era. Soon after the demise of the 
New Order in 1998, democratisation was 
taking place, searching for its format, and 
ultimately gaining momentum in the 
Yudhoyono presidency in 2004 onwards. 
Second, two periods – 10 years – of 
Yudhoyono’s tenure gave clues on the 
direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
This is in contrast with the Reform era 
when the duration of the power of each 
leader was no more than four years. It is 
much more difficult for any leader to 
concentrate on foreign policy issues by 
such limited time. Third, and arguably the 
most important, during Yudhoyono 
presidency Indonesia increasingly played 
prominent roles on the global stage that is 
unprecedented in modern Indonesian 
history. The activist nature of 
Yudhoyono’s foreign policy had been 
preoccupied with a high attention from the 
vast majority of people who has a concern 
about Indonesian politics.  
With regard to the latter, the key 
question is: what is the underlying cause of 
Indonesia’s rise? This paper is a critical 
examination of the four books written by 
experts on Indonesia’s foreign policy 
during Yudhoyono presidency. This paper 
discusses several basic questions that will 
be broken down into three sub-themes: 
whether Indonesia is categorized as an 
emerging or rising power, the driving 
factors behind Indonesia’s foreign policy 
activism, and Indonesia’s role in regional 
and global scope. 
Categorising Indonesia’s Rise 
The emergence of new powers in 
international politics is crucial because it 
would change our understanding of the 
world. The rise of a number of countries 
which he called ‘new emerging powers’ 
have challenged the assumptions that have 
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transform the pattern of international 
relations, even geographical category 
(Hurrel, 2013). The emergence of new 
powers’ groups such as BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 
IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), BASIC 
(Brazil, South Africa, India, China), and 
MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, 
Turkey, Australia) marked a new era of the 
21st century world politics. All of those 
countries – except Russia and Australia – 
were developing countries that never be 
considered as global powers. Moreover, 
the phenomenon of ‘club diplomacy’ as 
performed by those groups is intended to 
provide an alternative way of how to 
manage a better world considering the 
failure of the Western-led international 
system (Cooper & Antkiewics, 2008). The 
global system has moved towards the 
condition of the ‘post-Western world’ (see 
for example Zakaria, 2008; Flemes, 2009); 
Jongryn, 2015; Stuenkel, 2015).  
Perhaps it was no coincidence that 
the moment of Indonesia’s rise occurs in 
the midst of such geopolitical 
transformation. After wrecked by the 
economic crisis in 1998, the top priority 
agenda of the government was focusing on 
restructuring domestic architecture. 
Democratic consolidation, human rights 
protection, rule of law reinforcement, as 
well as economic restructurisation were 
four main pillars of the what so-called 
Reform Agenda. After Yudhoyono became 
president in 2004, his administration focus 
had begun to shift from domestic affairs to 
increase Indonesia’s role in international 
arena. He was fully aware that 
international politics had been changing 
dramatically and Indonesia should take a 
bigger leadership role. This is not only as a 
strategy to restore domestic conditions but 
also to seek status as a ‘global player’. 
In dealing with Indonesia’s 
outward-looking foreign policy, there have 
been enduring debates among scholars 
whether Indonesia is a rising or emerging 
power. Of the four books reviewed in this 
paper, only one book which agreed on the 
category of Indonesia as an emerging 
power. Acharya’s Indonesia Matters 
asserts that Indonesia is an emerging 
power not a rising power simply because 
Indonesia has no ambition to become a 
great power. Indonesian political elites do 
not consider their country as a great power 
and are more comfortable with the label of 
emerging power (p. 4). Acharya seemed to 
agree with the definition of emerging 
power as an economically powerful 
country but did not seek to change the 
status quo. In this regard, Indonesia is 
economically strong and could be a greater 
impact but did not attempt to change its 
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On the contrary, three other books 
considered Indonesia a rising rather than 
emerging power. As Anthony Reid put the 
term in his edited book Indonesia Rising: 
The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant; 
Indonesia is projected to be the ‘third 
giant’ after China and India. Reid argued 
that Indonesia had been a “punching below 
its weight” (p. 11). In other words, given 
the fact that Indonesia has large resources 
it should have been conducting assertive 
foreign policy. Yet, Indonesia behaves like 
a low-rank country. Indonesia’s foreign 
policy does not reflect its status as a rising 
power. Likewise, Donald Emmerson in 
this book assumed that whether Indonesia 
is a rising power or not depends on what 
the elite see, say, and do to enhance the 
role of Indonesia or detract from it (p. 50). 
He concluded that, “The rise of Indonesia 
is led by the country’s prominence and 
lagged by its performance” (p. 72). This is 
confirmed Reid’s argument regarding 
Indonesia’s limp diplomatic posture. 
The idea of Indonesia as a rising 
power is also supported by Vibhanshu 
Shekhar in his book Indonesia’s Rise: 
Seeking Regional and Global Role. 
Shekhar defined rising powers as “... an 
indeterminate and intermediate category of 
states between established great powers 
and middle powers, experiencing sustained 
rise in its composite capabilities (both 
material as well as non-material) in 
relation to its own strength in any time 
frame in the past, strength of the existing 
powers in the international system, or in 
relation to the state’s capacity to influence 
the international debate and agendas of the 
regional and global politics” (p. 4). 
Explicitly, Shekhar mentioned three Asian 
countries undergoing rising moment; 
China, India, and Indonesia (p. xi). In the 
preface he wrote optimistically about “... 
the various aspects of Indonesia’s success 
story, outline its changing outlook and 
roles in the region and the world, and 
analyse emerging contours of Indonesia’s 
long-term strategy as a rising power” (p. 
xii). The similar categorisation is also 
found in the book Indonesia’s Ascent: 
Power, Leadership, and the Regional 
Order. Christopher Roberts and Leonard 
Sebastian argued that along with the rapid 
growth of its economic, Indonesia is a 
‘rising middle power’ and will soon join 
the ranks of great power states (p. 1). In 
contrast to Acharya’s assumption, they 
challenged the idea of emerging power in 
which a country has no intention to 
improve its status as a great power. 
Despite the central theme of four 
books is Indonesia’s rise, they lack of 
clarity concerning the definition of a rising 
power. With the exclusion of Acharya who 
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Shekhar who has defined quite clear of the 
term, the work of Reid, Roberts and 
Sebastian do not provide a clear definition 
nor use it as a conceptual framework. 
Similarly, in the academic debates there is 
a conflating problem in differentiating 
between rising and emerging power. Most 
scholars tend to equate both. Nau and 
Ollapaly pointed out that rising power has 
the desire to change the world order (Nau 
& Ollapaly, 2012). This implies that rising 
powers demand the division of global 
leadership (Paul, 2016, p. 3). Rising 
powers are countries that position 
themselves as opposed to established 
powers because it seeks to change the 
global governance (see for example 
Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010; Kahler, 
2013). Rising powers perceive themselves 
as veto-players in international system 
although not having agenda-setting power 
(Narlikar, 2013). By veto-player it means 
that rising powers tend to change the status 
quo in international politics. These overlap 
with emerging powers concept. Cooper 
and Flemes, for instance, are conflating the 
term ‘rising’ and ‘emerging power’ by 
defining the later as a country that 
demonstrates a willingness to collaborate 
with multilateral institutions as a strategy 
for improving its status (Cooper & Flemes, 
2013, p. 947). Emerging powers have 
similar characteristic with rising powers in 
terms of foreign policy behaviour, that is, 
sought to reform or review of international 
order (Fonseca, Oliveira & Cunha, 2016, 
pp. 51-52). No matter how their economics 
look like, emerging powers tend to place 
themselves in the forefront of the global 
discord and collaboration. 
This conflation problem 
complicates us to define whether Indonesia 
is a ‘rising’ or ‘emerging’. If we agree 
with this conflation, then Indonesia can be 
categorised both as a rising and emerging 
power. As a result, Acharya’s conception 
of Indonesia as an emerging instead of 
rising power would be flawed since he 
focuses on the economic performance 
rather than global political agenda of a 
given country.  
For the sake of conceptual clarity, 
this paper argues that a rising power is a 
country that demonstrate an ambition to 
play a greater role in international politics. 
The term ‘a greater role’ means that rising 
powers demand power and burden sharing 
from existing global powers. 
Consequently, the rise of new powers in 
international politics almost always 
transform global balance of power. It is not 
only due to their relative power but also 
their aspiration or ambition to change 
global leadership. By conducting assertive 
foreign policy at the global level, a rising 
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great power status. As Miller has argued, a 
rising power is simply a country who has 
an ambition to become a great power 
(Miller, 2016, p. 216). Ambition should be 
represented by states’ action at the global 
level, not merely official statements of the 
government; saying is one thing, but doing 
is another. As shown later of this paper, 
Indonesia had been actively involved in 
various international issues and having 
enthusiasm to solve global problems. The 
ambition of a given country at the global 
level is the critical indicator – although not 
the only one – since there are many 
countries having large material capabilities 
have no ambition to be a global power. 
Saudi Arabia and Singapore, for example, 
may be strong states in terms of material 
capability since they have spent a huge 
defence expenditure over the years. Yet, in 
terms of foreign policy orientation they 
remain a regional power and relatively pay 
a little attention to the global politics. 
Thus, national power is necessary, but it is 
not a sufficient condition for a given 
country to become a great power.  
If ambition matters, then to what 
extent does Indonesia’s rise challenge 
international system? As mentioned 
before, the rise of new powers in 
international politics will bring global 
transformation as exemplified by the 
emergence of BRICS countries and other 
‘like-minded’ multilateralism. Yet, unlike 
BRICS that challenge the West, 
Indonesia’s rise will not alter international 
system nor stand in opposition to the West. 
The main objective of Indonesia’s activism 
is to become a global ‘problem-solver’. In 
his inauguration speech for the second 
term of his leadership, Yudhoyono stated 
that Indonesia will always conduct free 
and active foreign policy and strive for 
world peace and justice. He committed to 
make a better world order by playing 
leadership role in various global issues 
such as climate change, reforming global 
economy through the G-20, as well as 
harmony among civilizations (Kompas, 20 
October 2009). As we will see next, the 
prominent role of Indonesia on many 
issues has become empirical evidence to 
support the very idea of Indonesia’s rise. 
By playing leadership role Indonesia does 
not seek hegemony nor replace the 
Western dominance. Indonesia offered 
peaceful transformation of global order not 
by confrontation but rather by cooperation. 
Indonesia’s ‘peaceful rise’ committed to 
global partnership and connectivity. 
Yudhoyono coined the famous jargon ‘a 
million friends zero enemy’ reflecting 
Indonesia’s spirit to build a peaceful, just, 
democratic, and prosperous world 




 Page 8 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA: 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 




Indonesia’s assertive behaviour at the 
global stage has paved the way towards 
country’s great power status. Ambition 
alone, however, cannot determine a rising 
power status in international affairs. As 
Donald Emmerson in his chapter 
suggested, whether Indonesia is a rising or 
not is not merely depend on what elites 
see, say, and do but the country’s 
performance on the global level. We need 
to look at the reality how Indonesia 
behaves and the underlying factors behind 
it. The next section addresses the question 
of what is the causal variable that drive 
Indonesia’s rise during Yudhoyono era? 
And which approach is more convincing in 
explaining Indonesia’s rise? 
 
Explaining Indonesia’s Rise 
The rising of new powers in 
international politics can be explained by 
two perspectives; material and ideational. 
The materialist perspective contends that 
the rise of new powers is driven primarily 
by material factors, especially economic 
and military. Scholars in International 
Relations associate this idea with the 
neorealist premise which considers 
material capabilities as the key 
determinant of whether a state is 
influential or not (Waltz, 1979). On the 
contrary, the ideational perspective 
proposes an assumption that non-material 
elements such as ideas, identity, norms, 
status, reputation, and so on play an 
important role in the success story of 
certain countries to improve their global 
ranking. In the academic realm of 
International Relations, this view is 
represented by constructivism. 
Constructivist believes that international 
relations, including foreign policy, are 
influenced by ideational rather than 
material factors (Rosyidin, 2015).  
Among these books, Amitav 
Acharya represents the constructivist 
perspective proposing that ideas matter in 
world politics. He argued that Indonesia is 
a ‘normative power’; a state that promotes 
norms in managing its relationship with 
others. In contrast to other rising powers 
that tend to employ economic and military 
instruments, Indonesia promotes positive 
images, which is based on three pillars; 
democracy, development, and stability (p. 
1). One of these positive images reflected 
on Indonesia’s role as ‘norms-setter’. 
Acharya pointed Indonesia is very active 
in promoting peace both in the region and 
the world. Indonesia conceptualised norms 
of Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea, proposed the idea of ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ as the rule of the game of 
interstate relations in the Asia-Pacific, as 
well as initiated the Bali Democracy 
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commitment to democratic norms and 
human rights. By playing a role as norm-
setter, Indonesia’s foreign policy based not 
solely on the traditional national interest 
conception but the ethical consideration in 
order to create peace and stability. 
Meanwhile, the volume edited by 
Anthony Reid used materialist view in 
describing Indonesia’s rise. At the 
beginning of the book he asserted, “The 
chief reasons for optimism derive from 
Indonesia’s recent economic growth 
performance and favourable economic 
fundamentals” (p. 4). Put simply, 
Indonesia’s rise is by-product of 
magnificent economic performance. M. 
Chatib Basri in his chapter confirmed the 
argument, “It is true that Indonesia has the 
potential to play an important role in 
regional and global economy” (p. 46) 
which means the robustness of Indonesian 
economy plays a crucial role for state’s 
diplomatic posture. However, the book 
also recognises the importance of non-
material factors though not the main 
variable. Frank Jotzo in Chapter 6 of this 
book analysed Indonesia’s leadership role 
in the climate change issue. He argued that 
Indonesia has the commitment to the issue 
because of its awareness as a responsible 
and constructive global actor (p. 94). In 
addition, the identity as a world’s largest 
Muslim country also plays an important 
role. Martin van Bruinessen in Chapter 7 
of this book revealed the fact that 
Indonesia’s leadership in the Muslim 
world have long been an integral part of its 
foreign policy since the New Order era.  
Vibhanshu Shekhar in his book did 
not exclusively separate one to another. 
Rather, he combined material and 
ideational elements. Despite using 
neoclassical realism that gives priority to 
material factors, he tried to incorporate 
structural variable that is to say 
geopolitical landscape and domestic 
variables namely political elite perception 
and country’s strategic culture (p. 16). 
Structural variable especially the dynamics 
of geopolitical transformation marked by 
the rise of ‘Asian Century’ seems to be 
neglected by previous works. With this 
respect, the rise of China and India 
represents the rise of emerging countries in 
Asia, including Indonesia. According to 
Shekhar, “The emergence of new power-
configuration in the Asia-Pacific and 
growth of ASEAN-driven multilateral 
cooperative processes have offered 
Indonesia opportunities for regional 
leadership roles” (p. 37). In addition, 
Indonesia’s strategic culture is an 
underlying factor behind the diplomatic 
conduct, particularly within the region. 
This strategic culture underlies Indonesian 
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history, the struggle for independence and 
identity as a democracy (p. 194). In short, 
this ideational element reflects elite 
perception of the potential threats as well 
as how to deal with conflicts. 
Unlike Shekhar, Christopher 
Roberts, et.al viewed other factors, 
especially how Indonesia is projecting its 
power to the outside world. They use the 
rationale that power is the ability of a 
country to use the material resources 
(tangible) and immaterial (intangible) to 
influence other countries (p. 6). With 
regard to non-material resources, they 
follow Joseph Nye’s conception of soft 
power which includes cultural, political 
ideology, and ethics in diplomacy. Mark 
William in Chapter 4 of this book 
discussed the role of Indonesia’s identity 
as a Muslim and democratic country. He 
exemplified one of prominent Indonesia’s 
foreign policy agenda during Yudhoyono 
era is to promote the values of Islam and 
democracy. Indonesia wants to convince 
international community that Islam and 
democracy are not contradictory as well as 
to show that Indonesia is the most 
successful country that implements both 
(p. 86). Identity as a democratic country 
performed when Yudhoyono initiated Bali 
Democracy Forum in 2008. According to 
Avery Poole, Indonesia endeavours to 
promote democratic values abroad through 
this forum (p. 159). Indonesia’s 
commitment to the values and norms are 
also quite prominent in ASEAN. As 
demonstrated Christopher Roberts and 
Erlina Widyaningsih in Chapter 13, 
Indonesia has been playing a leadership 
role in developing ASEAN norms and 
institutions since ASEAN’s birth in 1967 
(p. 269). This is consistent with Acharya’s 
thesis mentioned before that Indonesia’s 
normative power is a source of soft power 
that contributed to its outward-looking 
foreign policy.    
The mixed approach that 
combining materialism and idealism is 
seemingly convincing. Except Acharya 
who employs tacit constructivism, most 
contributors in three other works recognise 
the importance of both material and 
ideational elements. Shekhar’s proposition 
perhaps is the most convincing account of 
the underlying factor behind the 
Indonesia’s rise. Although he put 
geopolitical transformation in Asia as an 
independent variable and seemed to 
overlook economic and military 
capabilities, his argument incorporated 
ideas as a crucial element. Obviously, 
Shekhar is not a constructivist; he is a 
(neoclassical) realist. He meant that 
ideational elements represent “domestic 
consolidation and expression of its 
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quite sophisticated given the fact that 
Indonesia’s foreign policy has been 
dominated by elite decision maker. 
Meanwhile, constructivist accounts that 
put identity, norms, and culture in 
explaining Indonesia’s rise also 
convincing. According to constructivist 
proposition, identities of a country define 
its interest and in turn direct foreign 
policy. As Wendt (1999, p. 231) pointed 
out, “Interests presuppose identities 
because an actor cannot know what it 
wants until it knows who it is.” Identity-
based arguments, however, are 
inappropriate because it does not directly 
drive foreign policy. In other words, 
identities have a significant impact on 
foreign policy if elites as policymakers 
perceive so. Indonesia’s identity as a 
‘norms-setter’ (argued by Acharya and 
Roberts and Widyaningsih), ‘largest 
Muslim country’ (argued by Bruinessen 
and William) as well as ‘democratic 
country’ (argued by Poole) are insufficient 
to explain why Indonesia is rising. Those 
multiple identities have been enduring for 
decades and have no greater impact on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy than that of 
during Yudhoyono era. If constructivist 
true, then Indonesia would have been risen 
since the Reform even the New Order era 
given the fact that Indonesia at that time 
had been attributed by those identities. In 
short, identity matters, but factors behind 
its implementation are more important. 
This paper argues that ideational 
elements plays a major role in determining 
whether Indonesia is rising or not. This is 
not to say that material elements primarily 
economic and defence posture are not 
important; it matters since a country would 
not be able to uphold its global visions 
without robust national power. However, 
domestic capabilities alone is inappropriate 
to explain Indonesia’s rise. This 
ideationalist approach differs from 
constructivist in the sense that it defines 
ideas in a personal way. While 
constructivist focuses on how ideas are 
socially constructed, this paper focuses 
merely on the impact of (elites) ideas on 
foreign policy. Thus, ideas and beliefs, 
particularly held by Indonesian leader 
plays a crucial role. Ideas, mainly take the 
form of world views, have the broadest 
impact on foreign policy (Goldstein & 
Keohane, 1993, p. 8). World views are 
modes of thought, discourse, and paradigm 
which define the world and what action 
should be taken in dealing with certain 
situations. Similarly, Miller underlined the 
importance of beliefs, that is, ideas held by 
political elites in conducting foreign policy 
as a root of state’s ambition to be a great 
power (Miller, 2016). Beliefs help 




 Page 12 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA: 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 




environment in which they are embedded. 
Conversely, beliefs also define who they 
are and what they want. In short, beliefs 
shape state’s identity and interests. Beliefs 
about attaining status as a great power 
derived primarily from elites debates about 
its role in world affairs (Miller, 2016, p. 
219). Thus, in order to understand why 
Indonesia is rising, we need to focus on 
how Indonesian leader defines its country 
and what it wants in the midst of global 
competition.  
Indonesia’s rise reflects elites ideas 
in understanding trends in the global 
politics and what kind of diplomatic 
conduct that should be implemented by his 
country to address it. For Yudhoyono, the 
nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy is 
internationalism or outward-looking.   He 
interpreted ‘free and active’ principle as 
the connectivity that would determine 
state’s influence and capacity to shape 
international order as well as projecting 
Indonesia’s international identity. For the 
later, Yudhoyono pointed out the 
importance of Indonesia’s status and 
reputation in the world. He added, 
“International identity defines a country’s 
role, place and standing in the world 
community. We should be a country that 
has a solid national identity, but also a 
strong international identity” (Yudhoyono, 
20 May 2005). As Yudhoyono had an 
ambition to drive its country toward a 
global stage, Indonesia’s concentric circle 
was no longer regional in Southeast Asia 
but global. This systemic view of foreign 
policy orientation was clearly expressed by 
Yudhoyono in his most cited speech at 
Wilton Park in 2012. On a global scale 
Indonesia had multiple roles, namely, 
norms-setter, consensus-builder, 
peacekeeper, bridge-builder, and voice of 
the developing world (Yudhoyono, 2 
November 2012). Indonesia’s activism 
during especially during the second half of 
Yudhoyono presidency (2009-2014) 
reflects these ideas. 
It can be concluded that ideas and 
beliefs held by President Yudhoyono are 
critical elements behind the ambition 
and aspiration of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. It transforms material 
capabilities into influence. How a given 
country exploits its national power will 
determine its international leverage. As 
David Baldwin suggested, “The 
distinction between ‘possessing’ power 
resources and using them – between 
having power and using it – is 
fundamental” (Baldwin, 2016, p. 68). 
Possessing large armies and weapons as 
well as enjoying a GDP boom do not 
necessarily mean achieving a great power 
status. The key is leadership; the ideas 
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his/her country’s influence in world 
affairs, and, more importantly, how they 
translate those ideas into policies. The next 
section will address Indonesia’s 
implementation of the ‘great power’s idea’ 
especially during the second half of 
Yudhoyono presidency. 
 
Indonesia’s Role In Regional and Global 
Scope 
Indonesia’s outward-looking 
foreign policy requires high engagement 
both regionally and globally. In Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia has long been played a 
role as a ‘regional power’ or the leader of 
the region. Indonesia’s leadership stood 
out primarily related to the existence of 
ASEAN as a regional organization in 
Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, the ASEAN 
is a ‘cornerstone’ of its foreign policy 
(Anwar, 1994). Since founded in 1967, 
ASEAN and Indonesia are mutually 
interdependent. Without Indonesia, 
ASEAN would not have been strong 
regional institution. Conversely, without 
ASEAN Indonesia would not have been 
gained prestigious status as well as 
economic and political opportunities.   
However, according to Shekhar, 
Indonesia is no longer oriented to ASEAN 
but more broadly by reaching the Asia-
Pacific region (p. 70) or the ‘post-ASEAN 
foreign policy’ (Sukma, 30 June 2009). On 
the contrary, See Seng Tan in Chapter 14 
of the book Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, 
Leadership, and the Regional Order 
argued, ASEAN remains important for 
Indonesia because of three reasons; first, 
ASEAN remains useful to contain major 
powers; second, ASEAN is useful to invite 
East Asian countries as strategic partners; 
and third, ASEAN is not an exclusive 
forum where Indonesia rely on it in order 
to achieve security (pp. 288-289).  
Though Shekhar emphasised Asia-
Pacific centrality in contemporary 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, it does not 
mean that Indonesia neglects ASEAN as a 
diplomatic stage. Shekhar mentioned three 
aspects of Indonesia’s leadership in 
ASEAN; as intelectual leader, crisis 
manager, and the anchor of community-
building (p. 86). Meanwhile, according to 
Christopher Roberts and Leonard 
Sebastian Indonesia’s regional leadership 
refers to ‘cooperative hegemony’ approach 
that emphasises the institutionalisation and 
strengthening of regional integration (p. 8). 
As intelectual leader, Indonesia is the 
‘mastermind’ behind the ASEAN 
institutionalisation, for instance, initiated 
the existence of ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and the ASEAN 
Institute of Peace and Reconciliation 
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AICHR is not formed ‘to protect’ but 
rather ‘to promote’ human rights values (p. 
58). In addition, Indonesia also contributed 
to engaging ASEAN in the G-20 forum in 
order that ASEAN interests can be 
accommodated in the forum. 
As a crisis manager, Indonesia 
strives to mediate conflicts involving 
ASEAN members. Since New Order era 
Indonesia’s role is quite prominent, such 
as mediating conflict between Cambodia 
and Thailand in Jakarta Informal Meeting 
(JIM) in 1988 and continued on the 
Cambodia-Thailand dispute over Preah 
Vihear in 2011. Indonesia also strived to 
create a regional security and stability by 
conducting shuttle diplomacy in 2012 to 
reach an ASEAN’s ‘six points principle’ 
related to a common view of the South 
China Sea disputes. Indonesia’s 
commitment to prevent conflict escalation 
between ASEAN members and ASEAN 
disunity reflect Indonesia’s role as a 
‘consensus-builder’. Yudhoyono (2 
November 2012) stated, “In reality, it is 
not always easy to attain agreement on a 
set of norms and principles. We will need 
extra efforts to build a consensus.” 
As an anchor of regional 
community-building, Indonesia has a 
strong commitment to encourage ASEAN 
to become a single community that has 
similar views, identities, and interests. 
According to Christian Roberts, the idea of 
ASEAN Security Community was the 
proposal of Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 
which was subsequently endorsed in the 
Bali Concord 2003 in order to, “... ‘share 
dependable expectations of peaceful 
change’ and ‘rule out the use of force as a 
means of problem solving’” (p. 270). 
According to Donald Weatherbee, the 
proposal of ASEAN Community had been 
overlooked by the government during the 
Reform era. Yudhoyono has a plenty of 
time, resources, priorities, and political 
mandate to promote the establishment of 
ASEAN community (Weatherbee, 2013, 
pp. 6-7). This commitment had evidently 
implemented through the executive order 
such as Presidential Instruction No. 
5/2008, Presidential Instruction No. 
11/2011 and Presidential Instruction No. 
6/2014 which are all intended to integrate 
the Indonesian economy into the ASEAN 
Economic Community (Fitriani in 
Aspinall, Mietzner & Tomsa, 2015, p. 79). 
At the global level, Indonesia’s 
prominent role was significantly high. This 
is reflected in the multiple roles played by 
Indonesia in various international issues. 
These roles represent Indonesia’s identity 
conception in the eyes of international 
community. As mentioned earlier, 
Indonesia played multiple roles; as a 
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builder, peacekeeper, and voice of the 
developing world. Anthony Reid in his 
edited book did not address Indonesia’s 
global role except at a glance. The book 
contained only two chapters on 
Indonesia’s global role, e.g. Indonesia’s 
role in climate change (Chapter 6) and in 
the Muslim world (Chapter 7). While 
Acharya in his book assessed Indonesia’s 
role in various multilateral institutions 
such as the G-20, NAM, OIC, UN Security 
Council, Bali Democracy Forum, and UN 
peacekeeping operations. In the G-20, 
Indonesia plays a role as a ‘bridge-builder’ 
(p. 101) along with ‘voice of developing 
world’ as stated in the previous section. At 
OIC, according to Avery Poole Indonesia 
plays a role as a ‘problem-solver’ and 
‘peace-builder’ particularly when 
addressing the humanitarian issue in 
Myanmar (pp. 159-160). 
Given the active role in various 
multilateral institutions, Shekhar called 
Indonesia as a ‘global multilateralist’ (p. 
103). Multilateralist is one of the 
characteristics of middle power diplomacy. 
As Cooper, Higgott and Nossal suggested, 
middle power foreign policy can be 
identified from the tendency to use 
multilateral institutions to find solutions 
for global problems or be part of global 
problem solving (Jordaan, 2003, p. 166). 
Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, and 
Turkey are middle powers carrying the 
notion of ‘multilateralism pivot’ to get the 
recognition and attention from 
international community (Wright in 
Jongryn, 2015, p. 21). According to 
Acharya, Indonesia utilises multilateral 
institutions not only to achieve the national 
interest, but also improve Indonesian 
image abroad (p. 99). 
In addition to Acharya’s account of 
Indonesia’s normative power stressing on 
ethical behaviour in international politics, 
Indonesia’s global role in many 
multilateral forums has also a significant 
contribution. Take for example Indonesia’s 
membership in the G-20. As suggested by 
Yulius Hermawan and Ahmad Habir in 
Indonesia’s Ascent book, “Indonesia’s 
engagement in the G-20 was a 
breakthrough in the history of Indonesian 
diplomacy” (p. 184). Its involvement in 
the most prestigious multilateral forum 
defines Indonesia’s international identity 
as a voice of developing countries. In 
addition, Indonesia’s role as a regional 
power also brings a greater impact on its 
diplomatic posture in the eyes of 
international community. For example, 
Indonesia played major role behind the 
ASEAN decision to bring Russia and the 
US into East Asian Summit (EAS) in 
2011. According to former Indonesian 
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decision to invite two great powers into 
EAS would help ASEAN to balance 
against China in the region (Antique & 
Adiati, 21 July 2010). This represents 
Indonesia’s conception of ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ which promotes the equal 
relations among great powers as well as 
encouraging multilateral cooperation that 
will benefit all of states. In his 
conversation with James Zirin of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, Marty 
defined dynamic equilibrium as a notion 
that, “…there is no dominant power for 
our region. But unlike the classic 
balance-of-power approach where we 
achieve this by having containment, by 
having a group of friends or similar, 
like-minded countries to address, to 
manage, to contain even a rising 
country, we create the notion of common 
security, common prosperity, and 
basically dilute -- put into context a 
certain rising country so that that 
country becomes a part of the -- like, an 
established -- a country that has a vested 
interest in maintaining the peace and the 
stability of the region rather than a 
(revisionist?) country” (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 27 September 2011). 
Put simply, Indonesian’s idea of 
dynamic equilibrium means absorbing 
great powers rivalry into a multilateral 
cooperation in which there is no a single 
dominant power enforcing its policy 
upon others.  
The rising character of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy also evident in its 
contribution to make a better world. It 
sounds a sort of ‘wishful thinking’ since 
traditionalists often argue that states 
conduct foreign policy to achieve national 
interests. Yet, national interest is not ‘the 
only game in town’ when discussing 
foreign policy. Sometimes states are more 
inclined to promote values and norms. 
Indonesia is not the exception. Acharya in 
Indonesia Matters was right stating that 
the normative power of Indonesia has been 
contributing to its rising. In addition to 
promoting democracy – for example 
through Bali Democracy Forum – and 
human rights – such as initiating AICHR – 
committing to the Kyoto Protocol by 
reducing carbon dioxide emission, as well 
as active participating in the UN 
Peacekeeping Operation, Indonesia also 
take a responsibility to help other countries 
suffering from humanitarian disasters. 
From 2006 to 2013, Indonesia had sent 
humanitarian assistance to fellow ASEAN 
countries due to tropical cyclone. For 
example, in 2008 Indonesia sent 23.000 
tons of humanitarian aid to Myanmar 
following cyclone Nargis, US$ 2 million 
to Philippine following cyclone Haiyan. 
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Japan following tsunami in 2011 (US$ 2 
million), Australia due to huge flood in 
2010 (US$ 1 million), Haiti due to 
earthquake in 2010 (30 medical team) and 
Turkey (US$ 1 million) (Rosyidin & 
Andika, 2017, p. 182). The most salient 
example of Indonesia’s humanitarian 
assistance is aiding the Rohingya people in 
Myanmar. Indonesian government not 
only sending foods and shelters but also 
building four schools for Rohingya 
children in 2013. The amount of aid might 
be small from the perspective of developed 
nations. But for developing countries like 
Indonesia, these humanitarian aids beyond 
its national interest but rather commitment 
to what so-called ‘good international 
citizen’ (see for example Evans, 27 August 
2015). Just like the commitment to send 
peacekeeping force under the UN 
umbrella, Indonesia’s commitment to the 
humanitarian aid reflects ethical foreign 
policy of ‘global good Samaritans’ and 
‘good international citizens’ (Hutabarat, 
2015, p. 52). Instead of focusing on 
narrow interest-seeking, the rise of 
Indonesia was aimed to prove its role as a 
‘responsible stakeholder’. 
 
Indonesia And The World: A Critical 
Review 
In many respects, this paper agrees 
with all authors in explaining the rise of 
Indonesia as a global actor as well as 
Indonesia’s role at the regional and global 
stage. This paper specifically agrees with 
Shekhar stating that structural constraints 
namely the shifting of global balance of 
power provides a setting for Indonesia to 
adjust its foreign policy orientation. This 
paper also in line with the argument that 
economic performance plays the most 
crucial factor that encourages Indonesia’s 
self-confident to engage globally.  
However, this paper argues that 
there are a number of shortcomings of 
some of the authors in understanding 
contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
The first issue relates to the debate over 
whether the rise of Indonesia is 
categorized as a rising or emerging power. 
As discussed earlier, except for Shekhar’s 
book that clearly provides the conceptual 
definition of rising power, the three other 
books did not address details indicators of 
a country classified as a rising power. 
Acharya’s definition of emerging powers 
is too simplistic. Likewise, Reid failed to 
provide a conceptual framework for 
defining what a rising power is. The book 
contains excessively empirical studies and 
lack of theoretical framework. While 
Christopher Roberts, et.al offers an 
analytical framework in the Introduction, 
they failed to give a clear distinction 
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power. In the last chapter of the book 
asked, “Why should we view Indonesia as 
an emerging power?” (p. 335). This 
inconsistency stems from the beginning of 
the book that does not provide an adequate 
conceptual framework so the contributors 
have different perspectives to define 
Indonesia’s rise. 
The second issue relates to causal 
factors of Indonesia’s rise. All authors 
seemed to ignore the idiosyncratic variable 
in building their argument. The only 
explanation that associates this variable is 
Donald Emmerson who suggested that 
whether Indonesia is rising or not is 
primarily determined by the vision and 
mission of policymakers (p. 50). As 
mentioned frequently before, 
understanding of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy is incomplete without taking elite’s 
ideas and beliefs into account. This is 
because Indonesian politics including 
foreign policy tends to be dominated by 
elite who undertake decisions and policies. 
According to an Indonesian expert, foreign 
policy has long been domain of the ruling 
elite (Wibisono, 2009). Individual factor is 
very important because foreign policy of a 
country is almost always in line with the 
character of the president. Therefore, 
personality and especially ideas and beliefs 
of the elite should not be ruled out. For 
example, the idea of ‘million friends zero 
enemy’, ‘navigating turbulent ocean’, ‘all 
directions foreign policy ‘, and ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ reflect how Yudhoyono 
perceives the world around him which it in 
turn affects how he conducts foreign 
policy. 
The third issue relates to the 
strategic culture as an ideational element 
of Indonesia’s rise. Shekhar’s thesis in his 
book stated that Indonesia’s foreign policy 
is influenced by its culture and history as 
well as beliefs and worldviews (p. 171). In 
academic literature, the very nature of 
strategic culture is inclined to national 
security and defence policy rather than the 
foreign policy doctrine in general. 
Strategic culture is a set of symbols that 
define, “... the role and efficacy of military 
force in interstate political affairs” 
(Johnston in Katzenstein, 1996, p. 222). 
Foreign policy doctrine usually translates 
into a ‘grand design’ or a ‘white paper’ 
which contains not limited to the security 
and defence policy but rather 
multisectoral. Thus, the use of strategic 
culture in explaining Indonesia’s rise as 
proposed by Shekhar’s book seems 
inappropriate. This is not to say that 
culture is not important in influencing 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia’s 
strategic culture deriving from the struggle 
of independence in 1945 is inappropriate 
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approach as implemented by Yudhoyono 
in several occasions, let alone ‘million 
friends zero enemy’ slogan. This is 
because, as an Indonesian scholar put it, 
Indonesian history especially the struggle 
of independence brings the military 
mindset into the decision-making process 
as well as fostering the syndrome of fear 
towards external powers (Sulaiman in 
Tellis, Szalwinski & Wills, 2016). 
The fourth issue associates with 
optimism versus pessimism regarding 
Indonesia’s prospect as a major power. At 
first glance, all authors showed an 
optimistic projection about the status and 
reputation of Indonesia in the global 
sphere. However, Reid’s edited volume 
contains several chapters indicating 
contradictory arguments. Reid seemed 
exaggerating when he said, “Goodbye 
China, hello Indonesia” (p. 1) as if to say 
the era of China’s rise has ended and 
replaced by Indonesia. Conversely, there 
are contributors who are pessimistic to the 
issue at hand. Donald Emmerson, for 
example, criticised using the ‘eagle’ 
metaphor that Indonesia, “... has not taken 
flight from the multilateral nests where it 
is necessarily out-numbered” (p. 74). 
Sharper criticism delivered by Rizal 
Sukma that Indonesia does not have an 
economic capability, political, and 
diplomatic resources to contribute to the 
world (p. 90). In short, there is an 
inconsistency in the Reid’s edited volume 
with regard to the projection of Indonesia’s 
rise. While the editor was very optimistic 
about the prospect of Indonesia to become 
a great power, some contributors were 
pessimistic based on their critical 
arguments. It would jeopardize the core 
argument of the volume as entitled ‘Asia’s 
Third Giant’ which sound optimistic about 
Indonesia’s status.  
In spite of several weaknesses, 
these books are entirely have similarities 
and complementary to each other. In terms 
of the debate whether Indonesia is rising or 
emerging power, all authors tend to agree 
with the former instead of the latter. 
Indonesia’s global engagement is a strong 
indicator of a rising power. In terms of the 
main factors behind the assertive nature of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, ideational 
variables act more as an intervening 
variable rather than the independent 
variable. Most authors consider economic 
and geopolitical structure in Asia as the 
main variable. In terms of Indonesia’s role, 
all authors equally agree that national 
identity – democracy, Islam, and pluralism 
– as well as the constitutional mandate of 
the vision of world peace, have 
encouraged Indonesia’s self-confidence to 
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Many Indonesian experts 
frequently ask: is Indonesia rising? The 
books reviewed in this paper share a 
common idea that Indonesia’s rise is 
inevitable. During the decades following 
independence, the degree of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy activism has never been 
high. All books under review confirm the 
materialist proposition – despite anyone of 
them put more emphasis on ideational 
elements – that economic capability is a 
major determinant of a rising power in 
order to be able to compete at the global 
level with a high degree of confidence. 
Without good economic performance, a 
country would ‘punch above its weight’. 
However, economic factor alone is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
a country to become a major power. It 
should be combined with a strong leader 
who has outward-looking vision. Without 
this idea, it would be very difficult for a 
country to improve its status and 
reputation globally. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy 
currently has been undergoing dramatic 
change. In contrast to his predecessor, 
President Joko Widodo – popularly known 
as Jokowi – puts a higher priority on 
domestic affairs rather than actively 
engage at the global level. He turns foreign 
policy orientation from internationalism to 
domestication while maintaining 
Indonesia’s role in international politics. 
However, Indonesia seems to overlook 
ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign 
policy. One of key Jokowi’s foreign policy 
adviser had proposed an idea suggesting 
that Indonesia should not stick to ASEAN 
(see for example Sukma, 5 October 2009). 
Indonesia gradually pulls away from 
ASEAN and settled into Indo-Pacific, a 
region that will serve Jokowi’s doctrine of 
‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’. Indonesia 
under Jokowi also prefers bilateralism to 
multilateralism to maximize its national 
interest, mainly to gain economic benefits. 
Recently, Indonesia is reviewing some of 
the membership in international 
organizations which are not considered 
important to save national budget.  
The question is: with the President 
Jokowi’s leadership style, will Indonesia 
still rise? Using argument proposed by 
these books, the answer is least-likely. 
First, Indonesian economy has not shown a 
good performance despite fairly stable. 
The economic growth rate is not the same 
as the previous era that was relatively 
stable at around six to seven percent a 
year. According to the IMF Indonesia’s 
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at five percent a year. The government 
even take a decision to cut budget in a 
number of ministries in order to save 
money. The second and most crucial factor 
is leader’s lacks of ideational motivation in 
bringing Indonesia into a global stage. 
Contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy 
pays less attention to the notion of 
‘normative power’ or ‘cooperative 
hegemony’ or ‘global multilateralist’ as 
mentioned before. The government 
focuses more on domestic issues and do 
not have plenty of time for active 
involvement at the global stage. Indonesia 
remains active in various multilateral 
cooperation. Yet, Indonesia seems 
uninterested in playing major role. Instead, 
Indonesia uses multilateral forum as an 
instrument to strengthen its bilateral 
relations with potential partners. For 
example, during the G-20 Summit in 
Hamburg 2017, President Jokowi arranged 
bilateral meetings with several delegates; 
the US, Dutch, Australia, Norwegia, 
Korean Republic, Vietnam, and Canada. 
Notwithstanding Indonesia’s proposal of 
counter-terrorism strategy during the G-20 
Summit, Jokowi inclined to bilateralism 
for the sake of domestic needs. In addition, 
during APEC and East Asian Summit 
Jokowi demonstrates a strong interest in 
conducting bilateral meetings with 
Indonesia’s strategic partners. 
The absence of internationalist 
paradigm makes Indonesia’s road to be the 
‘third Asian giant’ as clearly written on the 
cover of the book edited by Anthony Reid 
would be difficult even if not impossible. 
Strengthening domestic capabilities before 
playing active roles on the global scale is 
crucial in the first place. As an Indonesia’s 
foreign policy expert once suggested, 
internal restructurisation is a top priority 
before showing agility in responding 
external dynamics (Anwar, 2013). 
However, the present and next Indonesian 
leader needs a global vision in order to 
enhance Indonesia’s diplomatic posture as 
one of strategies in an attempt to achieve 
great power status. 
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